

Message Text

SECRET

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 RABAT 4437

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY FROM SAUNDERS
JIDDA EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR AND ATHERTON
CAIRO AND TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADORS

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PEPR XF US MO
SUBJECT: KING HASSAN'S VIEW OF MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS
AND SOME THOUGHTS OF MY OWN

1. I WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON OTHER QUESTIONS
DISCUSSED DURING MY 3-HOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH KING
HASSAN JULY 21 -- THE KING'S WASHINGTON VISIT,
MOROCCO'S USE OF U.S.-SUPPLIED F-5S IN THE SAHARA
AND MAURITANIA, AND MOROCCO'S MILITARY ROLE IN ZAIRE.
SINCE 2 OF THE 3 HOURS WERE DEVOTED TO A MOST THOUGHTFUL
AND PROBING EXCHANGE ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS
DEVOTED MOSTLY TO DISCUSSION OF THE NEED TO WIN ARAB
SUPPORT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, I WANT TO RECORD THAT
PART OF THE EXCHANGE FOR YOU, ROY, HERMANN, AND SAM.
WE ALL RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING THE
ARAB CONTEXT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND HASSAN'S
INSIGHTS -- WHILE I HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT HIS

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SECRET

PAGE 02 RABAT 04437 01 OF 03 221453Z

APPROACH -- STIMULATE THOUGHT.

2. THE KING TOOK OFF FROM THE END OF MY DESCRIPTION
OF WHERE WE STAND AND WHAT WE EXPECT FROM THE NEXT
ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS BY ASKING WHERE WE EXPECTED TO
LOCATE THE NEXT TALKS. HE EXPLAINED THE REASON FOR
HIS QUESTION BY RECOUNTING THE RECENT ROUND OF TALKS

STIMULATED BY PRESIDENT NUMAYRI AND THE THREE CONDITIONS DISCUSSED FOR RE-ESTABLISHING ARAB UNITY AND CONVOKING AN ARAB SUMMIT. HE RECALLED AS FOLLOWS THOSE THREE CONDITIONS AS THEY WERE ORGINALLY FORMULATED: FIRST, PRESIDENT SADAT MUST ENGAGE IN A PUBLIC, OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT HE WAS WRONG ALL THE WAY, AND THAT GOING TO JERUSALEM WAS A MISTAKE. SECOND, THERE MUST NOT BE ANY MORE MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS IN ARAB OR ISRAELI TERRITORY, THIRD, THERE MUST NOT BE ANY MEETINGS HELD IN THIRD COUNTRIES, NOT EVEN INDIRECT ONES. HAVING FIRST HEARD THESE THREE POINTS IN DAMASCUS, NUMAYRI THEN PROCEEDED TO ALGIERS WHERE HE GOT AN INSTANT REPLAY OF THESE IN THE SAME TERMS. BUT HE THEN EXPLAINED THAT AS A RESULT OF ALL OF NUMAYRI'S CONSULTATIONS THEN AND LATER, THOSE ORIGINAL CONDITIONS HAD BEEN MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS: SYRIA AND ALGERIA AGREE TO DROP THE FIRST CONDITION OUT OF THE DEFERENCE DUE TO A CHIEF OF STATE. THEY MAINTAIN THE SECOND CONDITION FIRMLY. SADAT'S OPPONENTS SHOULD NOT, HE ELABORATED, BE GIVEN A PRETEXT TO BLOCK MOVEMENT TOWARD DEVELOPMENT OF AN ARAB CONSENSUS. "WE WANT TO EXCLUDE THEM, NOT BE EXCLUDED BY THEM," HE SAID. THE KING THOUGHT WE WOULD SERVE SADAT'S INTEREST TO RESPECT THAT CONDITION. THEY YIELDED IN THE THIRD CONDITION AND WOULD EVEN AGREE TO DIRECT CONTACTS IF AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE PRESENTED ITSELF BECAUSE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE SHOULD NOT BE SECRET

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PAGE 03 RABAT 04437 01 OF 03 221453Z

ALLOWED TO SLIP AWAY. HE CONCLUDED BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS SHOULD BE HELD ON GENUINELY NEUTRAL TERRITORY -- NOT ON ARAB OR ISRAELI SOIL. I ASKED HOW HE FELT ABOUT OUR FACILITIES ON THE UN BUFFER ZONE IN THE SINAI SINCE THAT WAS ONE OF THE POSSIBILITIES, AND HE SAID THAT WOULD STILL BE OBJECTIONABLE SINCE IT WAS EITHER EGYPTIAN TERRITORY OR OCCUPIED TERRITORY DESPITE THE CURRENT UN AND US FLAGS. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WE, OF COURSE, HAVE NO STAKE IN WHERE THESE MEETINGS ARE HELD AND WOULD BE GUIDED BY PRESIDENT SADAT'S INTERESTS.

3. IT SOON BECAME CLEAR THAT HASSAN'S CONCERN FOR THE SITE OF ANY FUTURE MEETINGS STEMMED FROM HIS BROADER STRATEGIC CONCERN FOR THE EARLY CONVENING OF ANOTHER ARAB SUMMIT. HE FRANKLY STATED THAT HIS OBJECTIVE IN SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE TO WIN AS MUCH SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE AMONG THE ARAB STATES FOR THE PEACE PROCESS, FORCING EACH LEADER TO MAKE A CHOICE, AND PUSHING THOSE WHO REJECT THE CONSENSUS TO THE SIDE-LINES. THE RESULTS OF SUCH A SUMMIT WOULD FINALLY GIVE COUNTRIES LIKE MOROCCO THE FREEDOM TO SUPPORT

SADAT. HE ARGUED AS FOLLOWS: MOST ARAB STATES ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE CONTINUATION OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. IRAQ, SYRIA, ALGERIA, LIBYA AND SOUTH YEMEN MAY CONTINUE TO ADOPT A REJECTIONIST POSTURE, BUT THEY CANNOT SHAPE THE CONSENSUS OF AN ARAB SUMMIT. THEY MUST BE FORCED TO THE WALL AND, IF THEY DO NOT JOIN THE MAJORITY, THEY MUST BE ISOLATED. THEN THERE WILL BE A CLEAR SPLIT IN THE ARAB WORLD AND THE "WISE" COUNTRIES WILL PROCEED WITH MAKING PEACE WITH ISRAEL. (HASSAN DID NOT, HOWEVER, HAVE MUCH CONFIDENCE THAT PEACE WOULD BE MADE WITH A BEGIN GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH HE SPOKE POSITIVELY OF PERES AND WEIZMAN.)

HASSAN SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT THE PLO MUST BE PUT IN A SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 RABAT 04437 01 OF 03 221453Z

POSITION WHERE IT IS FORCED TO MAKE A CHOICE. IF IT WAS UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE CONSENSUS, JORDAN WOULD HAVE SUPPORT FOR ASSUMING NEGOTIATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PALESTINIANS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT OTHER PALESTINIANS RATHER THAN THE PLO COULD BE FOUND IN THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT THAT FOR THE MOMENT THE RABAT SUMMIT ENDORSEMENT OF THE PLO HAD TO BE RESPECTED.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 RABAT 4437

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY FROM SAUNDERS
JIDDA EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR AND ATHERTON
CAIRO AND TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADOS

IAJ WSSWM ENUHHSFING
N TRLLITICAL PROBLEM -- BUILDING ARAB SUPPORT
FOR THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AS IT IS NOW BEING CON-
DUCTED. I SAID, HOWEVER, THAT I WANTED TO EXPRESS
VERY FRANKLY SOME CONCERNS I HAD ABOUT THISPROCESS
SO THAT I COULD UNDERSTAND HIS THINKING. I WONDERED
WHETHER A HELPFUL RESULT FROM SUCH A MEETING COULD BE
ASSURED. I RECALLED A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS ON WHICH
ARAB LEADERS HAD MET WITH RESULTS THAT RESTRICTED THE
FREEDOM OF THOSE WHO WERE OUT IN FRONT. HIS ANSWER
WAS NOT REASSURING SINCE HE SPOKE OF THE 1974 RABAT
SUMMIT, WHICH ENDORSED THE PLO AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AS AN EXAMPLE
OF ONE OF THE BEST-CONTROLLED SUMMIT MEETINGS. BUT HIS
MAIN ARGUMENT WAS THAT THE "WISE" -- HE REJECTED "MODERATE" --
ARABS WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO ENDORSE A SERIOUS
NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHEN THEY WERE CONFRONTED WITH AN
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PAGE 02 RABAT 04437 02 OF 03 221507Z

ANALYSIS SHOWING THAT THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE AN
EXPANSION OF RECENT SOVIET SUCCESSES IN AFGHANISTAN,
SOUTH YEMEN, ETHIOPIA AND ALGERIA (SIC). HE FELT THAT
THE CASE FOR THE PEACE INITIATIVE WOULD BE CARRIED BY
ARGUING STARKLY THAT ITS FAILURES WOULD OPEN THE DOOR
FOR FURTHER SOVIET GAINS. IN HIS WORDS, ONLY THOSE
WHO WISH TO COMMIT SUICIDE WOULD FAIL TO SUPPORT THE
CONSENSUS. THE PLO AND THE SYRIANS WOULD BE FORCED
BY THEIR NEED FOR SAUDI AND GULF MONEY TO GO ALONG
WITH THE MODERATES.

5. SINCE HE HAD INTRODUCED HIS DISCUSSION OF A SUMMIT
MEETING BY RELATING IT TO THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIA-
TIONS, I THEN SUGGESTED THERE WOULD BE A CHOICE
ABOUT THE TIMING OF SUCH A MEETING. I SAID THERE
WERE TWO CHOICES. THE FIRST WOULD BE A MEETING COMING
EARLY AFTER THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
THE DISADVANTAGE OF THIS APPROACH WOULD BE THAT ARAB
LEADERS WOULD BE ASKED TO ENDORSE A PROCESS WITHOUT
BEING ABLE TO SEE PRECISELY WHERE IT MIGHT LEAD. THE
GREAT DANGER IN THIS WOULD BE THAT THEY WOULD UNKNOWINGLY
ADOPT POSITIONS THAT WOULD LIMIT FREEDOM OF MANEUVER IN
THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECOND POSSIBILITY WAS A LATER
MEETING. THE DISADVANTAGE OF THIS WOULD BE THAT, SINCE
ANY NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT WILL PROVIDE LESS THAN ALL

EITHER SIDE WANTS, THE ARAB LEADERS AT A SUMMIT WOULD BE ASKED TO ENDORSE COMPROMISES THAT WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM BY THE MORE EXTREME ELEMENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD. HASSAN ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED THAT A MEETING MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE END OF RAMADAN IN EARLY SEPTEMBER AND THE CONVENING OF THE UNGA LATER THAT MONTH. THIS WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE NEXT ROUND OF EGYPT-ISRAEL TALKS IN AUGUST.

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PAGE 03 RABAT 04437 02 OF 03 221507Z

6. FINALLY, I SAID I WANTED TO BE SURE HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE CENTRAL PLACE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH WE HAVE ACCORDED TO THE PALESTINIAN DIMENSIONS OF A SETTLEMENT. I UNDERScoreD THE FACT THAT, AT PRESENT, THE TALKS ARE CONCENTRATING ON A SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA -- THE GROUND UPON WHICH THE PALESTINIAN ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT WILL BE WORKED OUT. HE SPOKE THEN OF HIS CONTINUING INTEREST IN BRINGING THE PLO, ALONG WITH OTHER PALESTINIANS, EVENTUALLY INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN SPEAKING OF THE PALESTINIAN ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS, HE SHOWED FLEXIBILITY IN RECOGNIZING THAT THE PLO MIGHT ONLY SELECT THREE OF FOUR OUT OF TEN PALESTINIANS IN A REPRESENTATIVE DELEGATION. I SAID OUR PROBLEM IS THAT, GIVEN THE PLO'S PRESENT POSITIONS, I HONESTLY DOUBTED THAT WE COULD GET THE PLO INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THIS WAS ONE REASON I HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF TIMING OF AN ARAB SUMMIT WITH HIM. I SAID I THOUGHT IT VERY LIKELY THAT WE WOULD BE COMING TO ARAB LEADERS WITH A COMPROMISE PROPOSITION FOR AN INTERIM ARRANGMENT THAT WOULD NOT BE EASY FOR MANY OF THEM TO ACCEPT. SINCE THE PLO COULD NOT BE BROUGHT TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AT THIS STAGE, WE MIGHT WELL BE SUGGESTING SOME SORT OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT BUILT NOT AROUND THE PLO BUT AROUND THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE QUESTION FOR ARAB LEADERS AT A SUMMIT MEETING WOULD BE WHETHER THEY WERE PREPARED TO INSIST THAT THE PLO SUPPORT, OR AT LEAST ACQUIESCE IN, A PROCESS IN WHICH THEY WOULD NOT BE PRIMARY SPOKESMEN FOR PALESTINIAN INTERESTS. I SAID I DID NOT WANT TO PRESS THIS POINT FURTHER, BUT IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL TO US IF HE WOULD PONDER IT SO THAT WE MIGHT DISCUSS IT WITH HIM LATER.

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PAGE 01 RABAT 04437 03 OF 03 221515Z
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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 RABAT 4437

EXDIS HANLD AS NODIS CHEROKEE

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7. IN WRAPPING UP THIS PORTION OF OUR DISCUSSION, HE
RETURNED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF INVOLVING THE PALESTINIANS
IN THIS PROCESS. HE OFFERED ON THREE-WEEKS' NOTICE
TO GET TOGETHER IN MOROCCO A GROUP OF PALESTINIANS,
INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE PLO, WITH AMERICANS LIKE
SENATORS JAVITS AND CHURCH AND OTHER SUPPORTERS OF
ISRAEL. (AMBASSADOR BENGELLOUN ENCOURAGED THE KING
TO BELIEVE JAVITS AND CHURCH MIGHT PARTICIPATE IN
SUCH A MEETING.) I SIMPLY ACKNOWLEDGED THIS OFFER.
I WOULD ADD THE COMMENT THAT IN LATER CONVERSATIONS
DURING THE DAY, I WAS STRUCK BY THE MATTER-OF-FACT

WAY IN WHICH MOROCCANS OF ALL POLITICAL STRIPES
TALK ABOUT THEIR CONTACTS WITH ISRAELIS. THEY
SPEAK OPENLY OF DAYAN'S VISITS HERE AND OF THEIR OWN
CONTACTS WITH ISRAELIS, PARTICULARLY MANY OF MOROCCAN
ORIGIN.

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PAGE 02 RABAT 04437 03 OF 03 221515Z

8. COMMENT AND POSSIBLE ACTIONS: FIRST OF ALL, THE
QUALITY OF THE CONVERSATION WAS SUCH AS TO MAKE CLEAR
THAT, WHILE HASSAN IS A BIT APART FROM THE MAINSTREAM
OF OUR NEGOTIATING COURSE, HIS THOUGHTFULNESS ABOUT A
PROBLEM WHICH IS INDEED IMPORTANT TO THE SUCCESS OF

THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS -- NAMELY BUILDING ARAB SUPPORT -- WARRANTS OUR STAYING CLOSE TO HIM TO HELP HIM DEVELOP HIS THINKING IN WAYS THAT RELATE REALISTICALLY TO WHAT WE WILL BE DOING. MORE SPECIFICALLY, TWO OF HIS POINTS, IT SEEMS TO ME, WARRANT FURTHER EXPLORATION BY ROY AND HERMAN:

A. HASSAN MADE A BIG POINT OF HOLDING THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS ON GENUINELY NEUTRAL TERRITORY, POSSIBLY BACK IN THE UK, IN AUSTRIA, OR IN NORTH OR SOUTH AMERICA. HASSAN ASKED FERVENTLY THAT WE PROTECT HIS CONFIDENCE IN SHARING THESE THOUGHTS WITH US, BUT SEE NO REASON WHY ROY AND HERMANN CANNOT EXPLORE THIS QUESTION, ATTRIBUTING AS THE SOURCE SADAT'S PROMISE TO NUMAYRI THAT HE WOULD NOT HOLD SUCH TALKS IN EGYPT. HASSAN IS CLEARLY TAKING THE NUMAYRI MISSION AS THE EXISTING STARTING POINT FOR THEIR ARAB DELIBERATIONS ON THE PEACE PROCESS. THE QUESTION ROY MIGHT EXPLORE IN SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN IS WHETHER THEY ALSO REGARD THAT AS THE NECESSARY TAKEOFF POINT OR WHETHER THEY FEEL LESS COMMITTED THAN HASSAN ON THE QUESTION OF WHERE FURTHER MEETINGS TAKE PLACE. IN DISCUSSING THIS, WE MIGHT WANT TO LAY GROUNDWORK BY STRESSING THAT MEETINGS IN A U.S. FACILITY AT U.S. INVITATION ARE DIFFERENT FROM DIRECT CONTACTS ON ARAB TERRITORY. (SADAT, OF COURSE, SEEMS LESS CONCERNED THAN HASSAN ABOUT THIS WHOLE ISSUE.)

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PAGE 03 RABAT 04437 03 OF 03 221515Z

B. A SECOND QUESTION IS HOW AND WHEN TO PUT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS INTO AN ARAB CONTEXT IN AN EFFORT TO BUILD BROADER SUPPORT FOR IT. THERE WILL BE TWO ISSUES: (1) WINNING SUPPORT FOR THE SADAT INITIATIVE AND ITS FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS AND (2) MODIFYING THE MADATE FOR THE PLO FROM THE 1974 RABAT SUMMIT. OUR WORKING GROUP IN WASHINGTON HAS DONE A PRELIMINARY STUDY ON THIS SUBJECT AND WILL BE REFINING IT BEFORE YOUR TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT ROY'S TALKS IN TAIF AND AMMAN AND HIS TALKS ALONG WITH HERMANN WITH THE EGYPTIANS COULD CONTRIBUTE A GREAT DEAL ON THIS SUBJECT IF THEY WERE TO USE PART OF THEIR CONVERSATIONS TO EXPLORE THE ISSUES OF WHETHER THE PROPER WAY FOR WINNING ARAB SUPPORT IS AN ARAB SUMMIT OR A CONSENSUS BUILT BY EMISSARIES SHUTTLE AMONG A SMALLER NUMBER OF ARAB LEADERS. WE ALSO NEED TO EXPLORE THE QUESTION, AS I DESCRIBED IT TO HASSAN, OF EXACTLY WHEN EFFORTS TO CRYSTALLIZE SUCH A CONSENSUS SHOULD BEGIN.

9. I WILL BE WORKING WITH MY COLLEAGUES ON THESE
POINTS AS SOON AS I RETURN, BUT I BELIEVE WE NEED
THOUGHTS FROM ROY AND HERMANN AND THEIR SOUNDINGS
BEFORE WE CAN GO VERY MUCH FURTHER. OBVIOUSLY, AT
THIS STAGE, WE ARE IN A PRELIMINARY STAGE AND WILL
NOT ENTER MORE DETAILED CONSULTATIONS UNTIL YOU VISIT
SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN YOURSELF IN EARLY AUGUST. WE
CANNOT DECIDE NOW HOW TO HANDLE THESE QUESTIONS, AND
THE ARABS THEMSELVES WILL HAVE TO MAKE THE ULTIMATE
DECISIONS. BUT WE WILL NEED TO HAVE AS MUCH TENTA-
TIVE THINKING AS WE CAN GET TO WORK WITH IN THE NEXT
WEEK.
ANDERSON

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